The Sharing Economy – from a VAT perspective

3.1 General

The notion of “taxable person” embodies the subjective scope of EU VAT.28 This is evident by Article 2 of the VAT Directive, pursuant to which the supply of goods and services for consideration within the territory of a Member State by a taxable person acting as such is subject to VAT. The qualification as a taxable person is in other words a prerequisite for a transaction to fall within the scope of the VAT Directive. Therefore, it is one of the fundamental pillars of EU VAT.29 The definition of a taxable person can be found in Article 9(1) para. 1. According to this provision, a taxable person shall mean any person who independently carries out in any place any economic activity, whatever the purpose or result of that activity. Based on this definition, the CJEU has consistently underscored the extensive scope of Article 9(1).30 A broad approach is consistent with the aim of a neutral VAT system.31 It can also be said to be the ultimate consequence of the theory that VAT should be levied solely on private consumption.32 Moreover, the CJEU has repeatedly held that Article 9(1) is objective in nature, meaning that the activity is considered per se without regard to its purpose or result.33

There are two basic criteria that need to be fulfilled in order to obtain the status of a taxable person: (1) carrying out an economic activity and (2) doing so independently. These conditions will be explored in the following sections, starting with the former.

3.2 Economic activity

Economic activity is defined in Article 9(1) para. 2. In its first sentence, a non-exhaustive list of economic activities is provided. It encompasses all activities of producers and traders, as well as persons supplying services. In addition, the last sentence of Article 9(1) para. 2 provides more guidance, pursuant to which the exploitation of tangible or intangible property for the purposes of obtaining income therefrom on a continuing basis in particular shall constitute an economic activity. In view of the occasional nature of sharing activities, the standard of “continuing basis” is of great importance when evaluating the VAT treatment of the sharing economy, wherefore the attention will primarily be devoted to this particular component of economic activity.

At first glance, the condition of continuity may lead one to believe that occasional activities are excluded from the imposition of VAT. This line of reasoning might be amplified further by reading Article 9(1) in conjunction with Article 12(1). Through the latter provision, Members States are given the possibility to qualify any person as a taxable person who, on an occasional basis, engages in transactions corresponding to the activities referred to in Article 9(1) para. 2. Given that the circumstances under which occasional activities become subject to VAT are specified separately in the VAT Directive, it could by contrary inference be presumed that, if the option in Article 12(1) has not been utilized, occasional activities are precluded from VAT. This interpretation a contrario was also articulated by the CJEU in Enkler. By comparing Article 9(1) to Article 12(1), the court asserted that the concept of economic activity in the former provision does not encompass activities performed on an occasional basis.34

Nonetheless, in Wellcome Trust, where a large number of shares were sold by a charitable trust in one lot over the course of one day, Advocate General Lenz put forward the following in his opinion:

“in assessing an activity, it is neither the scope nor the duration which is conclusive, but solely the question whether that activity is an economic activity [...] The fact that the shares were sold over the course of one day has no bearing on the assessment of that sale for purposes of value added tax.”35

The CJEU subsequently concurred with the Advocate General’s proposition, adding that a large sale of shares could just as well be carried out by a private investor and, by using the scale of a transaction as a deciding factor, the existence of an economic activity would be determined on the basis of the investor’s skill and experience.36 Based on this, it could be inferred that one does not have to enter into a series of transactions to achieve the status of a taxable person.37 Moreover, the fact that a transaction is completed in one day does not necessarily mean that it is limited to that day. Conversely, it could pertain to an ongoing timespan.38

The CJEU has shed more light on how occasional activities can constitute economic activities in the context of exploitation of property. Noteworthily, In Van Tiem, an activity consisting of the acquisition and immediate granting of building rights for a time period of 18 years in return for annual payment has been treated as an economic activity, despite the fact that the transfer of building rights was regarded as a single transaction under national legislation.39 Furthermore, in Enkler alluded to above, a motor caravan was throughout three financial years hired out primarily for private purposes, albeit also twice to third parties.40 In determining whether this activity was carried out for the purposes of gaining income therefrom on a continuing basis, the CJEU put emphasis on the nature of the property,41 and differentiated between property that is suitable solely for economic exploitation, which could typically be classified as an economic activity without further examination, and property that is capable of being used for both economic and private purposes, where all circumstances in which it is used must be taken into account.42 Although the court did not take an explicit stance on whether the conditions in Article 9(1) were satisfied, they did not seem to find the presence of an economic activity to be inconceivable, in spite of the negligible extent to which the motor caravan was hired out to third parties. It could therefore be deduced that the threshold for taxability may not be very high when it comes to exploitation of private property.43

Another quintessential judgement on this topic is Słaby and Kuć, a case in which the CJEU pronounced on whether the occasional sale of land plots could amount to an economic activity. Repeating Wellcome Trust, the CJEU affirmed that the number and scale of the sales are not in themselves decisive.44 This also applies, perhaps somewhat surprisingly, regardless of whether the option in Article 12(1) has been used or not,45 something that further undermines the a contrario interpretation of that provision. What is decisive however, and this may be the crucial takeaway from the case, is if active steps are taken to market property by mobilizing resources similar to those deployed by a producer, a trader or a person supplying services within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 9(1).46 Such measures do not usually appertain to the management of personal property.47 In other words, the management of private property essentially becomes an economic activity for VAT purposes by commencing these active steps.48

The framework of “active steps” has been further built upon in subsequent case law. In Rēdlihs, where a force majeure sale of timber had been effected in order to mitigate losses induced by a storm,49 the CJEU echoed Słaby and Kuć in that those supplies must be considered an economic activity if the person concerned takes active steps in forestry management by mobilizing resources similar to those deployed by a producer, trader, or a person supplying services within the meaning of Article 9(1).50 Likewise, the precedent of “active steps” was regarded as a relevant assessment criterion in Kezić.51 In addition, Advocate General Wathelet recapitulated it in his opinion regarding Kostov. Premised on the decisions in Słaby and Kuć and Rēdlihs, he drew the conclusion that the VAT Directive does not in principle contain any exclusion for occasional activities carried out by a taxable person, as long as those activities do not fall within the private sphere.52 According to him, an otherwise interpretation would have the effect of chipping away at the principles of neutrality, equal treatment of economic transactions as well as the settled case law conferring a wide scope on the application of VAT.53 The court subsequently clarified the scope of Article 12(1), stating that Article 12(1) should not be understood as meaning that a person who carries out an economic activity permanently (self-employed bailiff in this case) and simultaneously an activity occasionally (partaking in an auction in this case) cannot be qualified as a taxable person regarding the latter activity as well. Hence, Article 12(1) applies exclusively to persons who are not already taxable persons in terms of their predominant activities.54

A final judgement touching on this theme is Fuchs, whereby the question arose if the supply of electricity to a public power grid via solar panels installed on the roof of the home of the individual concerned was an economic activity. The CJEU answered the question positively,55 a finding that was undercut neither by the fact that the amount of electricity produced never exceeded the amount of electricity consumed by the operator’s household, nor by the fact that the operator was merely trying to reduce his electricity bill.56 Unlike Słaby and Kuć, the court did not reckon whether any active marketing steps necessarily had been initiated.57 One may hence derive that not too many steps are required in order to attain the status of a taxable person.58 More broadly, it appears as though the concept of economic activity might have been expanded even further.59

In light of the foregoing, there seem to be some contradictions. On the one hand, the wording of the VAT Directive and a contrario interpretation by the CJEU in Enkler convey the impression that occasional activities are subject to VAT only if Member States choose to incorporate the possibility afforded to them in Article 12(1). On the other hand, the duration of activities was found inconsequential in Wellcome Trust. This was then reinforced in Slaby and Kuć, partly by reiterating the precedent of Wellcome Trust, partly by enabling exploitation of private property to be covered by Article 9(1) provided that active marketing steps have been taken. On the face of it, these two positions look to be virtually irreconcilable. Notably, Advocate General Wathelet opted to address this alleged paradox in his opinion in Kostov. He called attention to the fact that in Enkler, the conflict had to do with the distinction between business and private activities rather than the concept of occasional activities, why the court did not use the latter to answer the question at hand.60 Be that as it may, the court in Slaby and Kuć employed the private-economic dichotomy irrespective of whether Article 12(1) had been used or not.61

Whether the notion of economic activity necessitates a certain continuity is also a point of contention in the legal doctrine. Leaning on some of the above-mentioned case law, Terra and Kajus have rejected the a contrario interpretation of Article 12(1) and dismissed the idea that economic activity generally is conditional upon a certain frequency.62 They have pointed to the fact that the expression “continuing basis” in Article 9(1) refers only to a particular set of economic activities, namely the exploitation of property. It also applies to the income acquired from an activity, rather than that activity itself.63 Contrariwise, other scholars have submitted that incidental supplies are in principle excluded from the imposition of VAT, arguing that Article 12(1) may in fact be redundant if occasional supplies by default are to be treated as economic activities within the meaning of Article 9(1) as well.64 At the same time though, they have also emphasized that continuity is less imperative for certain forms of exploitation, like the grant of building rights in Van Tiem, as suchlike transactions instead facilitate persistence through obtaining consideration continuously.65

Notwithstanding this divergence, it is clear that each case has to be evaluated on its own merit, taking into account all relevant facts available.66 Under the aegis of such individual case-by-case examination, Slaby and Kuć indicates that what is ultimately decisive, as concerns both the condition of continuity as well as the boundary between private and economic exploitation, is whether active steps have been taken to market property by mobilizing resources similar to those deployed by a producer, a trader, or a person supplying services within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 9(1). Judging from the validation in later cases, the scheme of “active steps” appears to be rather well-established. It essentially confirms that the fact that an activity is carried out on an occasional basis does not in itself remove that activity from the scope of VAT.

3.3 Independence

In order to be treated as a taxable person, the economic activity has to be performed independently according to Article 9(1). Article 10 clarifies that the criterion of independence precludes employed persons from VAT. The removal of employees from the scope of VAT is borne by practical motives, keeping countless of employees outside of the administrative encumbrance of the VAT system.67 Article 10 thereto excludes other persons in so far as they are bound to an employer by a contract of employment or by any other legal ties creating the relationship of employer and employee. Whether such legal ties exist is determined on the basis of working conditions, remuneration and the employer’s liability. Hence, employees alone are not excluded. Instead, a more substantive outlook is called for, having due regard for whether someone de facto acts independently.68

The CJEU has had the opportunity to further elaborate on the meaning of “independence” on various occasions. In spite of being exposed to disciplinary control under the oversight of public authorities and the renumeration being determined by statute, Dutch notaries and bailiffs were in Commission v. Netherlands found to be independent by the CJEU.69 In particular, the court reasoned in the following way:

“Notaries and bailiffs, however, are not bound to the public authorities as employees since they are not integrated into the public administration. They carry out their activities on their own account and on their own responsibility; they are free, subject to certain limits imposed by statute, to arrange how they shall perform their work and they themselves receive the emoluments which make up their income.”70

Along the same lines, in Ayuntamiento de Sevilla, the CJEU deemed Spanish tax collectors to be operating independently,71 notwithstanding that they were appointed by and liable to instructions and disciplinary supervision of a municipality.72 Notably, the tax collectors themselves organized the staff, the equipment and the materials needed for pursuing their activities.73 In addition, the economic risk was borne by the tax collectors inasmuch as the profit was contingent not only upon the amount of tax collected, but also upon the expenses incurred on staff and equipment in relation to their activity.74 To whom the economic risk is allocated was also paramount in Van der Steen. In this case, the CJEU ruled that a person who was the sole shareholder, the sole manager and the sole staff member of a company could not be considered a taxable person since the company paid him a fixed monthly salary and an annual holiday payment. As such, he relied on the company to determine his renumeration, thus not carrying the economic risk.75

Drawing on the case law regarding independence, Terra and Kajus has capsuled the assessment into three concrete parameters distinguishing an independent activity: (1) the activity is performed by a person not organically integrated into an enterprise or an administration, (2) there is sufficient organizational freedom when it comes to the human and material resources that are used in the conduct of the activity, and (3) the parties in question bear the economic risk intrinsic in the activity.76

3.4 VAT registration thresholds

In Articles 281–292 of the VAT Directive, a special scheme for small enterprises is prescribed. Although, strictly speaking, the special scheme does not have any direct bearing on the qualification of taxable person, it is still worthy of inspection due to its high practical significance within the bounds of the sharing economy. Registration thresholds basically stipulate a lower level of economic activity, usually with annual turnover as the benchmark, beneath which businesses may choose to omit VAT registration and effectively have their supplies exempted provided that they do not deduct input VAT.77

The principal goal of registration thresholds is to decrease the administrative burden for small businesses to comply with the common VAT rules.78 At the same time, the registration thresholds differ considerably among Member States,79 an asymmetry that causes substantial market distortions and is undesirable from the perspective of neutrality.80 As a study in the UK has shown, VAT registration thresholds, in particular high ones, generate clusters of businesses situated just underneath the turnover level required due to the competitive edge in terms of VAT costs and savings resulting therefrom, thereby distorting behavior and disincentivizing economic growth.81

4.1 Economic activity in the context of the sharing economy

Considering that the occasional renting out of property constitutes the bedrock of the sharing economy, it is by no means surprising that the standard of “continuing basis” induces a multitude of problems as concerns users providing services through sharing platforms. Reminiscent of the motor caravan in Enkler or the solar panels in Fuchs, the overarching issue is the blurred lines between the private and the economic domain.

First off, recalling the opinion of Advocate General Lenz in Wellcome Trust, the duration of an activity is evidently not decisive for the assessment of economic activity. Applied to the sharing economy, an Airbnb host by way of example, apparently the number of times and the time frame during which an apartment is hired out is immaterial.82 In place of such aspects, in alignment with Enkler, the nature of the property is what is important. In this respect, assets that are exclusively suited for economic exploitation must be separated from assets that can be used for private purposes as well. As far as Uber drivers and Airbnb hosts are concerned, strictly commercial vehicles and buildings earmarked under cadastral rules as business property would fall within the former category.83 However, an apartment made accessible through Airbnb or a vehicle used for passenger rides via Uber would, by their nature, presumably more often have the capability of being used for private and business purposes alike.84 Under such conditions, the more complex examination of all relevant circumstances specific to the particular case has to take place in order to determine if an activity is carried through with the purpose of gaining income on a continuous basis. In this connection, the European Commission has submitted that the mere registration on a sharing platform in general signifies some continuity.85 Using Article 12(1), Slaby and Kuć and Kostov as the frame of reference, the European Commission stressed the wide meaning of economic activity, deducing therefrom that supplies made through the medium of the sharing economy might involve economic activities notwithstanding whether they are delivered continuously or occasionally. In particular, the European Commission gave prominence to the notion of “active steps” set forth in Slaby and Kuć, stating that a person subscribing to an online sharing platforms arguably takes those steps and, as a result, could be assimilated to a taxable person.86

The stance advocated by the European Commission is, however, somewhat controversial. On the one hand, as critics have underlined, it strikes one as being too excessive as well as disconnected from economic reality.87 Given that professional producers and traders commonly employ their own independent marketing and distribution channels and, as such, have the ability to supply goods and services without having to resort to online sharing platforms, it is not obvious that a mere subscription can simply be equated with active marketing measures similar to those of commercial actors.88 Indeed, one could argue that something more must be added to the equation. For instance, Uber drivers are often obliged to enter certain courses and acclimate their vehicles in accordance with legal transportation rules before they are permitted to provide car rides through the platform. Such actions could conceivably be looked at as active steps in the prospect of carrying out economic activities.89 Furthermore, the application of the European Commission’s position might be restrained in Member States that have not made use of Article 12(1). In this regard, Grlica points to Slovenia, whose omission to incorporate Article 12(1) has brought about explicit guidelines principally excluding providers of one-time supplies from being assorted as taxable persons.90 Beyond that, it appears as though joining an online sharing platform could be done for many reasons other than economic ones. The most obvious instance is someone signing up to use it entirely in the capacity of a consumer, neither offering any car rides nor renting out any rooms. By the same token, one could easily imagine someone subscribing simply to gather information about the platform.

On the other hand, as proponents of the European Commission’s approach has accentuated, completely excluding occasional activities from VAT would not be compatible with the precept of neutrality. Likewise, the possibility for an activity to be designated to the private domain appears quite narrow.91Slaby and Kuć as well as Kostov point right in that direction. By extension, it may be difficult for individual providers to avoid the definitions of economic activity and taxable person, especially given the very broad understanding the CJEU has of those concepts.92 Adding to that is the fact that Fuchs left the impression that not that many steps are needed to qualify as a taxable person. In that vein, one can safely infer that the criterion of economic activity is easily attainable by a myriad of individual suppliers in the sharing economy. Even so, it is hardly unequivocal that merely subscribing to a sharing platform in and of itself insinuates continuity.

All things considered, it remains ultimately unclear at which point individual providers can be viewed as exercising economic activities. This uncertainty is largely an outcome of the CJEU’s guidance primarily consisting of an overall evaluation of all circumstances on a case-by-case basis. While the precedent of “active steps” proceeded to concretize the assessment to some degree, in what way or manner that precedent should be applied to the sharing economy is far from crystal-clear. The absence of any lucid directions as far as what kind of circumstances are pertinent and how exactly those are supposed to be gauged in relation to the sharing economy has led some authors to express concerns over legal certainty.93 Indeed, the more circumstances that are in play, the greater the prospects of diverging inferences. As a matter of fact, the VAT Expert Group has cautioned that differences in VAT treatment could occur in the case of users renting their spare rooms to travelers searching for accommodation94 (i.e. the Airbnb case). More practically feasible guidelines specifically targeting the sharing economy could serve to resolve part of this ambiguity.95

Others have gone farther and even argued for an amendment of Article 9(1), enlarging the concept of taxable person to additionally encapsulate the discontinuous supply of services.96 However, in light of the CJEU’s case law, the scope of taxable person has already at present been given a sufficiently broad meaning as to encompass discontinuous activities. By extension, it is already wide enough to cover those activities carried out by individual suppliers like Airbnb hosts and Uber drivers.97 As such, totally revising Article 9(1) to accommodate the sharing economy comes across as rather superfluous. Instead, less profound tweaks more adequately targeting the existing shortcomings seem more worthwhile. Since one of the central tenets of the sharing economy revolves around the alternation of assets between private and business use, it is currently no effortless task to accurately determine the extent to which input VAT deduction is allowed for individual providers. In dealing with this obstacle, Beretta has promoted the insertion of fixed percentages for input deduction established at the EU level for each of the assets typically used in the accommodation and transport services. This way, the calculation of the deductible amount would be simplified. Being an EU-wide measure, the amount of input deduction would not differ among Member States either, ensuring equal competitive conditions. Through its uniform nature, it could also enhance legal certainty.98 In that spirit, it looks by all accounts like a step in the right direction.

4.2 Independence in the context of the sharing economy

The relationship between sharing platforms and individual suppliers bears prima facie the resemblance of an autonomous character. The platform supplies its users with intermediation services, while the individual service provider alone provides the underlying service to the final consumer. The perception that the platform does not have a finger in the underlying transaction between the provider and the recipient is embraced in the platforms’ terms of service, with both Airbnb and Uber depicting the individual suppliers as independent third parties.99 Given the background of such terms of use, the European Commission concluded that individual service providers for the most part act independently. However, the European Commission also underscored the importance of the economic reality,100 in particular if it repudiates the terms of service. In the event that the association between platforms and their users fundamentally has the earmarks of employer and employee, the issue of whether users operate in an independent fashion must be investigated thoroughly.101 The analysis has to be done on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the influence that the platform exerts over its users.102 Drawing on the wording of Article 10 and the specifications thereof from the related case law, Beretta has proposed evaluating the business models of the sharing economy in assent with a functional analysis, containing the following criteria: non-exclusionary membership, organizational autonomy, economic risk, regulatory autonomy, remuneration independence, personal liability.103

Looking at the economic realities of Airbnb and Uber through the lens of such assessment, both Airbnb hosts and Uber drivers seem to meet the first three conditions. Neither Airbnb hosts nor Uber drivers are forced to supply their services through the medium of only those platforms. Rather, memberships in multiple platforms are permitted. By virtue of executing the activities themselves as well as employing their own assets (residential properties and private vehicles), they could also be said to enjoy organizational autonomy in the sense of having a satisfactory degree of human and material resources to undertake the economic activities at issue.104 Moreover, they typically carry the economic risk implicated in the supply of the underlying service.105 On the flipside though, Airbnb and Uber enforce some disciplinary actions in the form of deactivation of accounts in so far certain terms have been breached,106 casting doubt upon the users’ regulatory autonomy.107 Although the existence of disciplinary control is not alone conclusive in light of Commission v. Netherlands and Ayuntamiento de Sevilla, the platforms of Airbnb and Uber thereto provide some insurance coverage,108 denoting a certain lack of personal liability for their users.109 However, what critically distinguishes Airbnb hosts from Uber drivers is that the former enjoy independence in terms of the renumeration as they are able to freely stipulate the prices,110 while the latter are bound to the pricing set by Uber.111 Overall then, against the backdrop of the greater bulk of the conditions mentioned, Airbnb hosts by and large display attributes delineating that of independent actors,112 whereas the characterization of Uber drivers is tougher to pinpoint.113

Devoid of any clear guidance as to the pigeonholing of Uber drivers, one may glance at the arguments advanced in a sprinkling of non-VAT rulings within the EU.114 As a cautionary note however, it must be emphasized that such judgements, in the capacity of non-VAT cases, do not render any categorical directions for European VAT. At the same time, they should not be downright swept aside either. In fact, The European Commission has deemed such cases useful when considering the potential VAT repercussions of relevant supplies.115 In Uber Systems Spain, the CJEU classified the intermediation service of Uber as a service in the field of transport rather than merely an information society service, inter alia highlighting that Uber exercises decisive influence over the services provided by the drivers.116 In this connection, Advocate General Szpunar stressed that even though Uber’s control is not exerted within the confines of a normal employer-employee relationship, Uber still handles the economically vital aspects of the transport service.117 Since the drivers’ activities exist purely because of the platform, he ultimately concluded that Uber is not simply an intermediary between drivers and passengers.118 By contrast, in a similar judgement but in the field of accommodation, the CJEU arrived at the opposite conclusion. Since the underlying service of accommodation is not influenced by the platform itself, the CJEU categorized the intermediation service provided by Airbnb as an information society service.119 Consequently, although the aforementioned cases do not concern VAT as such, they illustrate that the level of control that the platforms exercise over the individual service providers is not necessarily comparable as between Uber and Airbnb.120

Inasmuch as the economic reality would unveil a relationship of employment, the supply between Uber and the driver would be immaterial for VAT purposes. Instead, Uber would be responsible for charging VAT on the underlying supply.121 This would make Uber unable to recover the input VAT on the drivers’ acquisitions, considering that the assets used in sharing activities most often belong to the users. The incapacity to deduct input VAT holds true for the drivers as well, since their status as taxable persons would be lost as a function of them being treated as employees. As a result, a tax cascade effect would emerge, an event that visibly contravenes the cornerstone of neutrality.122 Along the same lines, the absence of VAT imposition on the drivers could lend them a competitive edge over providers of competing services who do not use these sharing platforms, possibly giving rise to distortions of competition.123 Notwithstanding that the label of employment may be a more adequate reflection of the connection between the Uber platform and the Uber drivers, such characterization might therefore bring fourth some drawbacks on a more systematic level.

4.3 VAT registration thresholds in the context of the sharing economy

Owing to a generally quite low annual turnover, many individual service providers in the sharing economy fall short of the registration thresholds, allowing them to make de facto exempt supplies. This gives sharing economy actors an upper hand in terms of VAT costs and savings over their ownership-oriented counterparts who are active within the same industries.124 A comparison between the conventional hotel business and Airbnb in London can serve as a concrete depiction of the advantage the latter enjoys. As reported by the Financial Times in 2017, property tax and VAT can add up to 17% of the price of an ordinary hotel room in London, while the VAT-proportion of the price of Airbnb bookings sometimes amounts to just a trivial 0,6%. This discrepancy can account for approximately a third of the additional expenditure of using a traditional hotel in London.125 The competitive leverage on prices resulting from this diverging VAT treatment seems hard to justify, especially since it essentially stems from a mere difference in business models.126

With the aim of safeguarding fiscal neutrality and equality, the EU VAT system has to enable traditional businesses to compete with the sharing economy on equal footing, irrespective of variations in business models.127 Although this requires constraints on the market distortions that the VAT registration thresholds give rise to, there is a trade-off to be made; administration and compliance costs being on the other side of the coin.128 In an effort to strike a more appropriate balance between simplicity and neutrality, the introduction of EU-wide maximum and minimum thresholds has in the VAT literature been suggested.129 To the same end, it has been recommended to make the thresholds mandatory rather than optional.130 These adjustments could alleviate some of the lopsidedness arising from the very diverse range of thresholds among Member States, smoothing the path for a more neutral treatment. Indeed, changing the current design of the registration thresholds into a single, common and mandatory one would likely bolster fair competition between the sharing economy and brick-and-mortar businesses both domestically and between Member States, without necessarily compromising the administrative motives underpinning it.131